Conservatives entitled to be proud of the Anglo-Irish Agreement

A little over two months ago marked the passing of the 25^th Anniversary of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The anniversary resulted in posts by Brian Walker of Slugger O’Toole and by and other articles by Newspaper journalists across Ireland.

One of the curiosities of the Agreement is that the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, James Molineaux was not consulted as the negotiations progressed. This is most odd. That the negotiations were taking place was not a state secret. From time to time, the fact of these discussions was made public. The SDLP was certainly consulted. In about September 1984, the Conservative Party, in edition No. 31 of their contact programme (“CPC 31”), published a detailed brief on the state of the negotiations at that time. It was available for sale in the Conservative Party bookshop for anybody who wanted to buy a copy. A link to this document can be located on the Conservative Party Archive website.

It is not as though the Ulster Unionists were sitting there doing nothing about the political problems either. In May 1984, they published their own document “the Way forward” (also for sale in the CPC bookshop). 

Perhaps when the Government archives are published in 3-4 years time, we will have a more precise picture on unionist consultation.

CPC 31 mentions the three proposals put forward by the Irish Government which were rejected by Mrs. Thatcher.  These were: a unitary state; a federal or confederal state; or joint authority. Dr. Fitzgerald, writing in the Irish times, recalled Mrs. Thatcher’s public reaction to those proposals in November 1984, some time after they were rejected.

On Open Unionism, in a post entitled “Reflections on the Anglo-Irish Agreement,” Turgon articulates the mainstream unionist view of the agreement. He recalls the sense of betrayal felt by unionists following the agreement. The Government would have known how Unionists would have reacted to the proposals, regardless of whether or not they had been consulted.  Why, then, did they risk alienating the great mass of the unionist population?

Better security was often cited as the main reason for it. Certainly, Mrs. Thatcher put a strong emphasis on the importance of better security but if that all there was to it, the agreement would not have taken place.

The 1981 hunger strikes proved to be a watershed in Northern Ireland’s political history. It launched the political career of Gerry Adams and later Sinn Fein representatives. This development worried the ROI Government, particularly.

The Catholic population in Northern Ireland was a large minority but barely represented in Parliament. In the 1983 General Election, the number of seats in Northern Ireland had been increased from 12 to 17. Still, the representation of the Catholic Population at Parliament was very small. Of those 17 seats, Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein had been elected as MP for West Belfast in place of Gerry Fitt. The only other non-unionist MP to be elected was John Hume in the constituency of Foyle.

The Government, rightly, perceived that there was a link between support for terrorism in the Catholic community and the lack of political representation. Looking for a solution to this problem remained a Government policy, despite the collapse of Sunningdale.

James Prior, Northern Ireland Secretary of State (1981-1984) summarised five principles which had to be observed, if there was political advance. These are set out in set out in contact programme document No. 31 at page 5: They were:

(i) The Constitutional position of Northern Ireland of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom can only be changed freely given consent of its people. This is not a matter of law. Any other approach would be immoral, undemocratic and unworkable.

(ii) Not all of the political aspirations of the two communities can be completely or equally satisfied. There are two identities to be accommodated, in an environment where alienation exists on both sides.

(iii) The government and administration of the Province must ultimately remain a matter for Parliament. This means that there cannot be any Unionist or nationalist veto over the framework which Parliament prescribes.

(iv) The distinctive needs of Northern Ireland are best met through a devolved administration commanding support from both sides of the community. In the absence of agreement the Government will continue to administer the Province in the way it judges to be in the best interests of all the people and of the United Kingdom as a whole. The determination of the majority to maintain the Union must be upheld but this must be balanced by showing due regard for the minority’s interests in any internal arrangements.

(v) Geography, history and economic interest together with the identification many in Northern Ireland feel with Dublin call for a closer relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic.

There was nothing wrong with the Government’s principles or motives for signing the Agreement.  As it turned out, the Agreement yielded very little in terms of security gains. However, the political gains are still underrated. The agreement, fully supported by the SDLP helped many Northern Irish nationalists to see the UK Government in a new light. The agreement also secured formal recognition, by a Republic of Ireland Government, that Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom.

Today, the scars of the Anglo Irish Agreement are still felt by unionists. At the Ulster Unionist Party conference in December 2008, David Cameron felt compelled (albeit in an oblique manner) to make an apology for the signing of the Agreement.  Looking back on that speech, David Cameron’s apology had more to do with appeasing Ulster Unionists than taking responsibility for a political wrongdoing.  He should not have made that apology, unreservedly. 

The unfortunate thing is that many Northern Irish Unionists still do not seem to recognise their community’s failure to be fair to Catholics in the past was a major cause of the Anglo-Irish agreement coming into effect. In CPC 31, the Conservatives said this about a UUC proposal to turn the regional Assembly into a super council:

“The local Government was the sphere where most of the discrimination has tended to take place; matters such as housing and education are thus extremely sensitive.”

Back in 1985, power sharing seemed a long way off and Northern Ireland unionists were angry. They can not deny that the Agreement was a stepping stone to the Belfast Agreement.

In years to come, they will not be able to deny that the Belfast Agreement (and therefore the Anglo Irish Agreement) paved the way for peace, prosperity, a stronger union and a shared future for Northern Irish people.

Conservatives, meanwhile, should not be ashamed of the Anglo-Irish agreement. They have every reason to be proud of their government’s achievement at the time.

Apologising for the past wrong of your forbears

Yesterday, I woke to the horror of a piece of recent British history that I was completely unaware of – the sending away of the British children to Australia purely to “unburden” the British authorities. 

Australia was a young sparsely populated country in need of more people for its development.  In those days, the Australians did not want Asian immigrants.   What better way to enhance that development than to import children of white Anglo-Saxon British stock?  It probably seemed like a reasonable arrangement at the time.

Fast forward to 2009.  The Australian Government has now apologised for its part in the ordeal and it appears that Gordon Brown is now about to apologise for the British side of the arrangement. 

This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that a politician has apologised for events that he personally he had nothing to do with.  In 1970, the West German Chancellor Brandt expressed sorrow and Germany’s responsibility for the holocaust.  The late Pope Jean-Paul II apologised for the treatment of Galileo by the Catholic Church.  In 2000, Tony Blair apologised for the wrongful conviction of the Guildford four.  In 2003, the Queen gave an apology for the ethnic cleansing brought about by the deportation of Acadians in Nova Scotia in 1755.   A couple of months ago, Gordon Brown apologised for the treatment of Alan Turing, a code breaker during the Second World War.  In 1954, he committed suicide after being prosecuted for homosexuality and then being forcibly treated with female hormones.  The overwhelming majority of these political apologies have happened in the last 40 years.

Political apologies have a purpose.  Taking responsibility for an event, even when a politician had nothing to do with it, is a way of contributing to the healing process felt by victims. 

Ah, you might ask how can anybody be a victim when the wrongdoing happened before they were born? 

A “victim” for these purposes does not have to be the person who suffered the wrong directly.  It can be a relation or a group which inherits a communal memory which affects relationships amongst the living many years later. 

Is there anything to apologise for in Northern Ireland in 2009?  If so, who should do the apologising and when should it be done?

The apologies, if they are going to be made, have to be considered very carefully.  An apology should be saved for the time that it is going to make the most impact.  It certainly is not a good time to apologise if the “victim” or communal victim is not going to be able to accept the apology and move on. 

There are various groups or parties in Northern Ireland that have some apologising to do.  If they are interested in better community relations, then now is the time to plan their apology.  I am not going to single out any group or party here.  Those reading this post will be able to think of plenty of wrongs which politicians should take responsibility for.  My specific interest is in relation to the British Government.  Does it have anything to apologise for in relation to Northern Ireland?

In 2002, Tony Blair apologised to the people of Ireland for British conduct during the potato famine.  That was a good start and it went down well with people in the Republic of Ireland.   Is there anything else the Government could do?

I don’t wish to gainsay the findings of the Saville report.  However, I suspect there could be some adverse findings against the British Army.  If there are such findings, then the apologies should be without hesitation and be as remorseful as it is possible for a Government to be.   

There is, however, one particular event or series of events for which the British Government does have some responsibility – a fact which does affect community relations today.   It is a fact that before 1972, the British Government neglected Northern Ireland in terms of its failure to intervene against democratic and civil rights abuses.  

When the Conservatives win power, I would like to see such an apology being made on behalf of the British Government but timing and sensitivity is extremely  important.  

If it is not handled correctly, it will incur adverse criticism, as happened when two years ago, Peter Hain apologised for the role that Wales and Northern Ireland played in the slave trade.  Now that the UUP is in alliance with the Conservatives, it is essential that they are involved in the planning of that apology and that they are ready to make their own as well.