Conservatives entitled to be proud of the Anglo-Irish Agreement

A little over two months ago marked the passing of the 25^th Anniversary of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The anniversary resulted in posts by Brian Walker of Slugger O’Toole and by and other articles by Newspaper journalists across Ireland.

One of the curiosities of the Agreement is that the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, James Molineaux was not consulted as the negotiations progressed. This is most odd. That the negotiations were taking place was not a state secret. From time to time, the fact of these discussions was made public. The SDLP was certainly consulted. In about September 1984, the Conservative Party, in edition No. 31 of their contact programme (“CPC 31”), published a detailed brief on the state of the negotiations at that time. It was available for sale in the Conservative Party bookshop for anybody who wanted to buy a copy. A link to this document can be located on the Conservative Party Archive website.

It is not as though the Ulster Unionists were sitting there doing nothing about the political problems either. In May 1984, they published their own document “the Way forward” (also for sale in the CPC bookshop). 

Perhaps when the Government archives are published in 3-4 years time, we will have a more precise picture on unionist consultation.

CPC 31 mentions the three proposals put forward by the Irish Government which were rejected by Mrs. Thatcher.  These were: a unitary state; a federal or confederal state; or joint authority. Dr. Fitzgerald, writing in the Irish times, recalled Mrs. Thatcher’s public reaction to those proposals in November 1984, some time after they were rejected.

On Open Unionism, in a post entitled “Reflections on the Anglo-Irish Agreement,” Turgon articulates the mainstream unionist view of the agreement. He recalls the sense of betrayal felt by unionists following the agreement. The Government would have known how Unionists would have reacted to the proposals, regardless of whether or not they had been consulted.  Why, then, did they risk alienating the great mass of the unionist population?

Better security was often cited as the main reason for it. Certainly, Mrs. Thatcher put a strong emphasis on the importance of better security but if that all there was to it, the agreement would not have taken place.

The 1981 hunger strikes proved to be a watershed in Northern Ireland’s political history. It launched the political career of Gerry Adams and later Sinn Fein representatives. This development worried the ROI Government, particularly.

The Catholic population in Northern Ireland was a large minority but barely represented in Parliament. In the 1983 General Election, the number of seats in Northern Ireland had been increased from 12 to 17. Still, the representation of the Catholic Population at Parliament was very small. Of those 17 seats, Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein had been elected as MP for West Belfast in place of Gerry Fitt. The only other non-unionist MP to be elected was John Hume in the constituency of Foyle.

The Government, rightly, perceived that there was a link between support for terrorism in the Catholic community and the lack of political representation. Looking for a solution to this problem remained a Government policy, despite the collapse of Sunningdale.

James Prior, Northern Ireland Secretary of State (1981-1984) summarised five principles which had to be observed, if there was political advance. These are set out in set out in contact programme document No. 31 at page 5: They were:

(i) The Constitutional position of Northern Ireland of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom can only be changed freely given consent of its people. This is not a matter of law. Any other approach would be immoral, undemocratic and unworkable.

(ii) Not all of the political aspirations of the two communities can be completely or equally satisfied. There are two identities to be accommodated, in an environment where alienation exists on both sides.

(iii) The government and administration of the Province must ultimately remain a matter for Parliament. This means that there cannot be any Unionist or nationalist veto over the framework which Parliament prescribes.

(iv) The distinctive needs of Northern Ireland are best met through a devolved administration commanding support from both sides of the community. In the absence of agreement the Government will continue to administer the Province in the way it judges to be in the best interests of all the people and of the United Kingdom as a whole. The determination of the majority to maintain the Union must be upheld but this must be balanced by showing due regard for the minority’s interests in any internal arrangements.

(v) Geography, history and economic interest together with the identification many in Northern Ireland feel with Dublin call for a closer relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic.

There was nothing wrong with the Government’s principles or motives for signing the Agreement.  As it turned out, the Agreement yielded very little in terms of security gains. However, the political gains are still underrated. The agreement, fully supported by the SDLP helped many Northern Irish nationalists to see the UK Government in a new light. The agreement also secured formal recognition, by a Republic of Ireland Government, that Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom.

Today, the scars of the Anglo Irish Agreement are still felt by unionists. At the Ulster Unionist Party conference in December 2008, David Cameron felt compelled (albeit in an oblique manner) to make an apology for the signing of the Agreement.  Looking back on that speech, David Cameron’s apology had more to do with appeasing Ulster Unionists than taking responsibility for a political wrongdoing.  He should not have made that apology, unreservedly. 

The unfortunate thing is that many Northern Irish Unionists still do not seem to recognise their community’s failure to be fair to Catholics in the past was a major cause of the Anglo-Irish agreement coming into effect. In CPC 31, the Conservatives said this about a UUC proposal to turn the regional Assembly into a super council:

“The local Government was the sphere where most of the discrimination has tended to take place; matters such as housing and education are thus extremely sensitive.”

Back in 1985, power sharing seemed a long way off and Northern Ireland unionists were angry. They can not deny that the Agreement was a stepping stone to the Belfast Agreement.

In years to come, they will not be able to deny that the Belfast Agreement (and therefore the Anglo Irish Agreement) paved the way for peace, prosperity, a stronger union and a shared future for Northern Irish people.

Conservatives, meanwhile, should not be ashamed of the Anglo-Irish agreement. They have every reason to be proud of their government’s achievement at the time.

NI Centre Right Campaign strengthened by events of the last week

Child abuse comes in many forms. Nearly all child abuse falls into one of three categories: neglect, physical harm and emotional abuse. All forms of abuse by a parent or carer involve some form of emotional abuse.

Not all child abuse by Parents is driven by wickedness or selfishness. Sometimes, the root cause of child abuse is illness by the parents or parents simply not being able to cope.

If the abuse is severe enough, it falls into the category of ‘significant harm.’ If a child is suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm, the child protection authorities are obliged to intervene. In the worst of these cases, if the parents show no sign of wanting or being capable of providing a suitable upbringing for the child, the child will go into care. In exceptional cases, more likely with infants, the authorities will place the child for adoption. Metaphorically speaking, “child abuse” has occurred in the Conservative and Unionist family.

The Conservative Party is more than 300 years old. The Orange Order is more than 200 years old. In the earlier years of Orangism, these two organisations did not like each other. Relations were at their lowest ebb when, in 1829, legislation for Catholic Emancipation was passed under a Tory Government. However, they had one thing in common. They were unionists. The rise of the Parnellites brought them into a relationship.

In 1905, the Ulster Unionist Party (the UUP) was born. The UUP was a bastard child of the Conservative Party. The Other parent was the Orange Order. From the time of that birth, the Conservative Party were content to leave the care and upbringing of the UUP to the Orange Order whilst continuing to acknowledge it as its child.

The Orange Order was a bad parent. It engendered an attitude of antipathy and mistrust towards Catholics. The UUP became papaphobic, just like its Orange mother. Its Conservative father neglected it by not being involved in its upbringing. The UUP became a bully but its Conservative father, proud to acknowledge it when they met in the UK Parliament, could not see that it was doing anything wrong.

The UUP then got into trouble. When the civil rights riots broke out, the Conservatives were obliged to take some responsibility. When the Conservative father asked the UUP to accept some Sunningdale treatment, its mother objected. For a short period, the UUP was torn between the wishes of its mother and its father. Papaphobia was still a dominating influence. Inevitably, the UUP rejected Sunningdale. Like a sulking teenager, the UUP stopped talking to its father. The father attempted to talk sense with its son but to no avail. The combined effect of the political power vacuum and the deteriorating security situation led the father to signing the Anglo Irish Agreement. This caused so much anger that the UUP cut off all remaining ties with its father.

Shortly afterwards, the Conservative Party fathered another child. This child was a legitimate non-sectarian daughter. The Northern Ireland Conservatives had been born. For a short time in its early life, this child was encouraged to survive and thrive but soon suffered from neglect. It was hungry and undernourished. Because it achieved nothing, it was ignored by its father. Nonetheless, the daughter was dutiful and did what it was told by its father.

The UUP’s mother started to become frail and weak, suffering from a debilitating long-term illness which will eventually lead to its death – secularism. With the mother’s influence declining, the UUP drifted slowly towards moderation and signed the Belfast Agreement. When the Northern Ireland Conservatives saw that its father approved this development, it became jealous. In a desperate attempt to get its father’s attention, it opposed it. Still the Conservative Party ignored its daughter.

The UUP, having been badly beaten by an ever strengthening DUP, sought to get back on terms with its father. Reconciliation then occurred. However, the father wanted the UUP to be locked permanently into the family. The UUP was asked to enter into a marriage with the Northern Ireland Conservatives. The marriage proposal was rejected. Instead, an agreement was made that they live together. The result of this relationship was the birth of UCUNF.

The relationship between the UUP and the Northern Ireland Conservatives did not work out and the UCUNF child was abused by the UUP when it decided to equivocate over possible candidate deals with the DUP and internal wrangles over candidate selection resulting in crucial delay. Going into the 2010 General election, a sole unionist candidate was selected for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. Northern Ireland Conservatives were traumatised. The UCUNF child, already unhealthy going into the 2010 General Election, had been severely abused by its father and grandfather.

The UCUNF infant later died. The UUP walked away from its relationship with the NI Conservatives and told its father that it wanted the NI Conservatives out of the house.   The Northern Ireland Conservatives did not want the relationship to continue either.   The UUP’s rejection of a continuation of the link, or any future election pact, gave rise to confidence of Northern Ireland Conservatives that it would, at last, receive the support it deserved from its father.  The father had to choose between one of its children to decide who would represent National policy in Northern Ireland. In the end, a parent’s selfishness played a crucial part in the decision.

This brings me to the end of this sorry mythical tale. I apologise for the very few historical distortions which have appeared. It is sometimes appropriate to use a little bit of artistic licence to illustrate an important point.

The Northern Ireland Conservatives have been rejected, in my opinion, to a point where it is not possible for them to continue as a regional branch of the main Conservative Party. The position of trust and confidence is not something that is capable of being restored.

Alex Kane likens this position to something akin to inevitable political infanticide. I completely agree. That being the case, there is only one way for the Northern Ireland Conservatives to go. It should become an independent party. An independent party needs a political niche. That niche is a centre-right party which would take no position if there was a referendum on the future of Northern Ireland. Admittedly, there may still be a battle of persuasion ahead in relation to that last point.

As a lifelong Conservative supporter, I deeply regret what has happened. However, every cloud has a silver lining. The civilised campaign that I was conducting was always likely to be difficult, so long as there was such a strong attachment between local conservatives and the main party. With the severe weakening of that attachment, there is no doubt that the Northern Ireland Centre-Right campaign has been strengthened.

In time, as Northern Ireland Conservatives lick their wounds, they may well conclude that the events of the last few days were all for the best.

Conservatives – We must put any immediate prospect of dumping the UUP out of our minds

The Conservative Party has held a presence in Northern Ireland politics since the mid 1980s.  It has had very little electoral success.  One of the reasons for that was a failure by Conservative Leadership to direct resources to enable its Northern Ireland branch to build a political power base.  Perhaps it was correct to avoid doing that before the Good Friday Agreement. 

In December 2005, David Cameron became the leader of the Conservative Party.  Soon after that, he made public his vision for politics in Northern Ireland.  Speaking to the Institute of Directors in October 2006, he said this:

“I want politics in Northern Ireland to be about the real things – schools, hospitals, tax…not about timetables, deadlines and institutional arrangements.  And I want the Conservative Party to be a part of that new politics. We’re moving in a new direction.  Leading the debate.  Pulling ahead of a tired Government.  Developing policies for the future. In doing so, one thing is certain. My Party’s commitment to Northern Ireland, and to all its people, will be whole hearted and unshakeable.”

David Cameron’s speech epitomised what Northern Ireland Conservatives have always wanted – normal politics in Northern Ireland.  One of the steps necessary to achieving that objective is to move Northern Ireland away from its semi-detached status by giving its people a say in who will form the next National Government. 

Very soon, we will have a General Election and the first part of David Cameron’s objective will have been achieved.  I say “first part” not just because the Labour Party are not yet here but because Mr. Cameron was not just talking about tax.  In a clear reference to devolved powers and the Northern Ireland Assembly, he also mentioned schools and hospitals.  Furthermore, his reference to “real things” and “not about timetables, deadlines and institutional arrangements” was a clear indication of his desire for an end to sectarian politics.

Not all Northern Conservatives agree that being in partnership with the UUP was the right way to pursue David Cameron’s vision. 

Some in our party have argued, not without considerable force, that the UUP is not a party which is capable of moving away from sectarian politics.  It has also been argued, again not without considerable force, that the Conservatives are not capable of winning Parliamentary seats or building up a significant power base in Northern Ireland without a partnership with one of the leading Unionist parties.  If you agree with both of those viewpoints, then you will have reached a conclusion that there was never anything the Conservatives could have done to bring about normal politics in Northern Ireland.  I am one of those that dont agree with either argument. 

To borrow an old cliché, there is no such thing as a free lunch in the jungle.  Whichever path the Conservative party chose to work for normal politics in Northern Ireland, there was always going to be a lot of hard work with many hazards and very little electoral reward in the short term.    

The path chosen by the Conservatives was the link-up with the UUP.  After much thought and agonising on this subject, I eventually concluded that it was the right route to take even though there is no certainty that the pact will survive after the General Election.

The UUP have considerable obstacles to overcome in moving away from sectarian politics.  Within the last couple of months, the UUP has been lampooned for its equivocation in relation to making deals with the DUP to promote unionist “unity” candidates.  From an electoral tactical point of view, this equivocation has been rightly described as a missed opportunity to gain the ascendancy over the DUP during its weakest moment during the Christmas period.  The positive aspect to this struggle is that, in the end, the UUP came down firmly and unequivocally in favour of the pact with the Conservatives.  For those of us who have charted the progress of the UUP, this is the sort of struggle which goes with the territory, whenever a party is evolving.  There will be further struggles ahead.

Yesterday, the UUP voted against the transfer of powers for Police and Justice.  In my opinion, this was an error of judgment which will have much more of an impact on their political fortunes than their decision to hold talks with the DUP over unionist unity.  Within the Unionist community, there is a majority who would have supported the transfer of P & J from at least a pragmatic point of view.  Peter Robinson and his party will not have taken lightly their decision to support the transfer of powers.  Unfortunately for the UUP, the DUP have “read the tealeaves” correctly and the UUP have not. 

Even more damaging to the UUP is the prospect that Unionist voters will no longer consider them to be the moderate voice of Unionism as compared with that of the DUP.  That makes it much more difficult for the UUP to distinguish itself from the DUP as the party of civic unionism.

It will also make it much more difficult for the Conservatives to justify a future partnership with the UUP after the General Election.  Pressure will undoubtedly grow within the Conservative Party not to enter into any further pact. 

I am one of those who would not wish to rule out further pacts or even a merger between the Conservatives and the UUP.  For one thing, the latter has many moderate civic unionists within it who could yet rise to the top.  If failure in the next Assembly Elections is the price that brings that about, it could very well be a price worth paying.  

Meanwhile, we in the Conservative Party should be patient.  We must allow time and space for the UUP to continue their evolution.  We should commit ourselves to working in partnership with the UUP at least until beyond the next Assembly Elections.  Above all, we need to remind ourselves that one of our aims is to influence the Unionist community towards our way of thinking.  We are much more likely to do that in a partnership with the UUP than outside it.  We must put any immediate prospect of dumping the UUP out of our minds.

“Head banging” needed but UCUNF can still survive and thrive

Yesterday, at long last, details of the Hatfield House talks emerged, albeit in the Guardian and the Times also discussed on Jeffrey Peel’s blog.  As a result, we now have substantial have clarity over the matters which we feared would give us much cause for concern.   

Putting the two reports together, we now have confirmation that Owen Paterson did discuss with the UUP and the DUP the possibility of a new unionist party or force which would have three core commitments.  These were   

• Non-sectarianism.

• Making the Northern Ireland assembly and the executive work.

• Upholding power-sharing with nationalists.

I would not blame any reasonable unionist for nodding his head in agreement on reading those bullet points.  Unfortunately, the first core principle in this proposal (non-sectarianism) is now impossible to achieve on the basis of forming a united unionist party or force.  Moreover, Unionism has to be relegated from being a dominant political ideology if we are ever to achieve normal politics in Northern Ireland.   

Earlier this week, following the news that Alex Kane had resigned from his post as UUP communications director, Lord Trimble published on his blog copies of the emails that were exchanged of emails between himself and Mr. Kane in November 2009.  That exchange has illuminated a wide difference in the thinking behind the UCUNF project.  Consider particularly the following points made by David Trimble.  

“On the project your test is whether Cameron will back the unionist cause. How is that cause to be defined? Is it the Union or “facing down” nationalists? The project has the potential to widen and deepen the union. I know that large numbers of Catholics are effectively little “u” unionists. I was talking to several at last night’s Queens University Association London event, where I was speaking on this matter. But big U ethnic unionism will exclude them and force them back into ethnic nationalism. 

The project was never about lining up the Conservative party alongside ethnic Unionism, but about replacing political structures based on constitutional and national issues, with politics based on social and economic issues using the same party structures that operate elsewhere in the UK. Incidentally for this we need the participation of Labour as well as the Conservatives. Between them Catholics can be offered something better than SF to vote for”  

Note particularly the words highlighted in bold.  In the paragraph that follows, he contrasts the scenario whereby the Conservatives line up alongside ethnic Unionism with “normal” politics which he describes as “politics based on social and economic issues using the same party structures that operate elsewhere in the UK”.  In other words “left – right” politics, whereby Conservativism and Democratic Socialism replace Unionism and Nationalism as the dominant political ideologies.   

When I wrote my essay on Conservativism, it was my understanding that the leaders of both the UUP and the Conservatives held a similar vision and viewpoint.   

I am sure that Owen Paterson regrets holding talks with both the UUP and the DUP at Hatfield.  He is still an exceptionally able politician who has done so much good work to help facilitate normal politics in Northern Ireland.  I have no doubt that he will be quick to grasp and accept the principles behind David Trimble’s comments. 

I am not yet quite so sure about the leaders of the UUP.   The exchange of e-mails between Trimble and Kane highlighted another significant difference in the expectations of the UCUNF project.  It seems that the Ulster Unionists believe that it is acceptable to change the current power sharing structures under legislation brought by a Conservative government, regardless of Nationalist sensibilities.   

Few would disagree that the current arrangements are politically dysfunctional and inefficient.  However, any change to the system without cross-community consensus is simply not going to happen under a Conservative Government.  As David Trimble makes clear, the Power Sharing structures were negotiated as part of a global constitutional settlement for Northern Ireland.  If they are altered without Nationalist consent, it will hurl Northern Ireland backwards into the darkness.   

Incremental evolution is what is needed to change the power sharing structures, not revolution.  Over a period of time, such evolution can and should happen in an orderly negotiated way.  Also, I do not believe that the SDLP is so far away from talking “turkey” about constitutional changes.  Consider the following remarks made by Mark Durkan on the subject of changing power sharing structures.  Here I repeat part of a post from Liam Clarke of the Sunday Times, September 14, 2008. 

“Durkan’s words were measured.  He described how the present system of all-party coalition at Stormont had developed with the SDLP’s support, and suggested that it may be nearing the end of its shelf life. In particular, he questioned the tribal system of “community designation” at Stormont which parcels out jobs to politicians on the basis of whether they choose to be nationalists or unionists.

“The system of designation was necessary because of where we were coming from but should not be necessary where we are going,” Durkan said. “I argued that such measures with their arguably sectarian or sectional undertones should be bio-degradable, dissolving in the future as the environment changed.”

He said it was necessary to have communal protection for nationalists and unionists, or Protestants and Catholics, while the new institutions bedded in, but that this essentially tribal arrangement should not become permanent. “As we move towards a fully sealed and settled process we should be preparing to think about how and when to remove some of the ugly scaffolding needed during the construction of the new edifice,” Durkan argued, making the case for a bill of rights to protect against abuses before any changes are made.

Durkan’s suggestion is for cross-community government with entrenched human rights safeguards, but not necessarily every party in government every time. He pointed to the cumbersome system of checks and balances which have paralysed decision making since devolution. “Protections of rights, interests and identities will still be needed but not only for, or only as, either unionists or nationalists,” he ventured. “

Surely this is the clearest indication that the SDLP is the party to do business with on the question of changing the Power Sharing structures.

There now needs to be some serious “head banging” and understanding between leaders of the Conservatives and the UUP with a view to being at one on political vision, long-term political objectives and the means by which they are to be achieved.  That should have happened before the pact was formed but there is still time to discuss it and arrive at a meeting of minds. 

The two recent meetings (Hatfield House and Schomburg House) have damaged UCUNF because they lend credence to the perception that they will too readily abandon their aspiration to bring non-sectarian politics to Northern Ireland in favour of short-term political advantage.  In reality, the willingness to hold those talks was driven by well-meaning but misconceived political vision.  The bottom line is that nothing has been agreed as a result of those talks.

Right now, leaders from both the UUP and the Conservative Party should be having meetings to review what has gone wrong and hopefully reach a conclusion that the Trimble way is the right way.  If they can surmount those difficulties and bring their membership behind them, I believe UCUNF can survive and eventually thrive.  There is still everything to play for.

Have the Conservatives made any political concessions to the DUP?

In my post yesterday, I published a transcript of the of part of the interview of David Cameron on the Politics Show on which Northern Ireland was discussed.  I resisted the temptation to write any analysis about it.  I needed a “head-scratching” sessioin.    

This morning, I still can not ignore the fact that David Cameron did not use the interview to deny that any political deal had been done with the DUP, particularly after Jon Sopel’s first question.  The Belfast Telegraph has also noticed this. Commenting on Lord Mandelson’s attack, they write:  

“His attack follows the disclosure that shadow Northern Ireland secretary Owen Paterson convened secret talks between the two main unionist parties at the country estate of the Marquis of Salisbury.  

The move has prompted speculation that the Tories are attempting to establish a pan-unionist front to restrict the number of seats the nationalist Sinn Fein and SDLP can win in the general election.”  

The particulars of that speculation are that the DUP will not contest seats in South Belfast and Fermanagh and South Tyrone.  This presumption has been further fuelled by the news that the DUP have suspended selection procedure for its parliamentary candidates.  It is possible (but unlikely) that the DUP have decided to unilaterally withdraw their candidates without any political concession from the Conservatives.   

In the interview with Jon Sopel, David Cameron insisted that the Conservatives would be even-handed (as between the Nationalist parties and the Unionist parties) in dealing with the peace process.   

If the DUP have been granted a concession of any sort, it will certainly affect the dynamic of the current negotiations on Policing and Justice and the DUP’s future political calculations.  David Cameron’s claim of even-handedness can only stand up if the Conservatives have not given any kind of political concession to the DUP.  

Last week, I invited Owen Paterson to clear the air for us and confirm categorically that no deal of any kind has been reached with the DUP.  It is in the interests of the Conservative Party and Northern Ireland that we receive that clarification.

Update:  Polling Analysis highlights how strong a motive the Conservatives would have had for making a deal with the DUP

Yesterday, Electoral Calculus updated its analysis and prediction on the state of the parties following the next general election.  It now predicts that there will be a hung parliament with the Conservatives just two short of an overall majority.  Northern Ireland is not included in its analysis.   On the basis of it, two seats from Northern Ireland would provide the Conservatives with an overall majority of one.

The non-sectarian way is the only proper way to oppose Sinn Fein

In my previous post, following the Hatfield House meeting, I invited Owen Paterson to “clear the air” on speculation that the Conservatives may be agreeing to or acquiescing in a pan-unionist pact involving the DUP, which amounts to an entrenchment of sectarian politics. 

Before I go on, let me repeat that there were perfectly legitimate reasons for having the talks between the parties concerned.  The possible collapse of the Executive is a worry.  The Conservatives, acting as the party about to form a Government, would be absolutely right to explore ways to save to the Peace process.  

I do not claim to have any influence over Owen Paterson, let alone David Cameron.  What is perfectly obvious though is that with neither of them having spoken further about the talks, there remains a stench in the Northern Irish political air.   Unfortunately, the stench has become worse as the week has progressed.  Peter McCann and Sheila Davidson have now revealed that part of their reason for resigning as candidates was a fear that the UUP would do a separate deal with the DUP.   Furthermore, as The Times indicates, Mr. Paterson has not yet held talks with the Nationalist Parties. 

The result is that Conservatives are now left with a credibility problem as far as their non-sectarian credentials are concerned.  That problem is now being compounded by the ill-informed writings of journalists and bloggers from across the water.

Once the Labour Party weighed in with their criticism of the Hatfield House talks, it was inevitable, as the night follows the day, that some Conservative journalists would rise to the bait.  Benedict Brogan of the Daily Telegraph seems to have been the first fish to bite this worm. His piece is clearly written without any discussion of one of the central aims of the Tory / UUP pact, which is to drive sectarianism out of Northern Ireland Politics. 

A much more thoughtful piece was written on Conservative Home by Paul Goodman.  Much of it contained entirely sensible reasons why the Hatfield House meeting should have taken place.  It is therefore a pity that he wrote this sentence in support of Ben Brogan.

“It’s essential, Ben wrote, “to find political ways to ensure Sinn Fein doesn’t end up the winner as the result of the failure of Unionism in Northern Ireland to get its electoral act together” (and such ways, incidentally, don’t necessitate a DUP/UUP merger).

This is the first reason why we were right to promote the recent talks between pro-Union parties.”

The words “to find political ways to ensure Sinn Fein doesn’t end up the winner” have not been fully explained but it is difficult to read those words in any way other than that the Conservatives should be prepared to embrace a pan-unionist pact. 

I reject that notion.  It is worth repeating the fourth paragraph of the pre-amble to the Memorandum of Understanding which the Conservatives and the UUP signed up to on 20^th November 2008. 

“Both parties recognize the need to change politics in Northern Ireland, are committed to reaching out to the increasing numbers of alienated voters, and developing non sectarian politics in Northern Ireland.”

There is only one, non-sectarian, way to oppose Sinn Fein.  That is to fight for the votes of people from all communities at elections.  That may look like an insurmountable task to some.  It is not, so long as Conservative and Unionist politicians are prepared to take a very long – term view of politics.

UPDATE

I have just stumbled upon an email circular which was sent to me on Friday 22nd January by David Fry, the Conservative Agent for Northern Ireland.  It reads

“During his two day visit to Northern Ireland this week Mr Paterson met with deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness MP MLA to discuss the ongoing political instabilities in Northern Ireland”

That partially answers the criticism  in “the Times ”  reporting on the comments of Alasdair McDonnell.  Perhaps Mr. Paterson should be talking to the SDLP as well.

How the known unknowns could affect the General Election results in Northern Ireland

With 2010 around the corner, the General Election becomes ever more omnipresent. 

Voting outcomes in Northern Ireland at the General Election will be harder to predict than in any other region.  Since the Assembly Elections in 2007, so many new features have emerged (we will call them “known unknowns”) onto the political scene that the results of past elections can be viewed as nothing more than a starting point.  We may be in a new era of voting trends but until new patterns emerge, the old ones should not yet be ignored.

The tables below are the percentages achieved by the four main Northern Ireland political parties since 1992, excluding the Euro elections apart from 2004 and 2009 (because the votes for Ian Paisley and John Hume were personal votes). 

A = Assembly Elections.   C = District Council Elections   P = UK Parliamentary Elections  E = European Elections

	P 1992	C 1993	F 1996	P 1997	C 1997	A 1998	C 2001
DUP	13.10	17.00	18.80	13.60	16.00	18.14	21.40
UUP	34.50	29.00	24.17	32.70	28.00	21.25	22.90
SDLP	23.50	22.00	21.36	24.10	21.00	21.97	19.40
SF	10.00	12.00	15.47	16.10	17.00	17.63	20.70
Others	18.90	20.00	20.21	13.20	19.97	21.02	15.60

 

	P 2001	A 2003	C 2005	E 2004	P 2005	A  2007	E 2009
DUP	22.50	25.60	29.60	32.00	33.70	30.10	18.10
UUP	26.80	22.70	18.00	16.60	17.70	14.90	17.00
SDLP	21.00	17.00	17.40	15.90	17.50	15.20	16.10
SF	21.70	23.50	23.20	26.30	24.30	26.20	25.80
Others	8.70	11.20	11.80	9.10	6.70	13.20	22.00

The following graph below is a representation of these tables  (please click the graph to see it enlarged).

The graph shows that the voting strength declined for both the SDLP and the UUP before the Good Friday agreement.  The relationship between Sinn Fein’s level of support and that of the SDLP follows a much smoother trend than that of the Unionist parties.  This is due, in part, to the fact that the leading Unionist Party tended to attract a higher level of support at a General Election, where the first-past-the-post system of voting still exists, than at the Council and Assembly Elections.  However, averaging out these trends shows that between 1992 and 2007 the UUP has fallen from 35% to 17% (down 18%) In the same period, the DUP has advanced from 13% to 30% (up 17%).  In these 15 years, that would make a swing of 17.5%

The Sinn Fein advance would have began since it first entered elections in 1981.  After a brief relapse following the Enniskillen bomb in 1987, they reverted to their long term upward trend at the expense of the SDLP.  Between 1992 and 2007, Sinn Fein moved from 10% to 26% (up 16).  In the same period, the SDLP moved from 24% to 16% (down 8).  That represents a swing from SDLP to Sinn Fein of 12%.

The graph and the tables also indicate that the decline of the moderate parties seems to have been arrested at the latest European Election.  Perhaps that has something to do with the fact that Sinn Fein and the UUP are now at the head of Stormont.

The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey has been an enigma in terms of the results of the Elections, for a number of years.   They show great inconsistency between the support of a party in terms of sympathy and allegiance and what happens at the polling booth.  In the 2007 survey, in response to the question “Which Northern Ireland political party do you feel closest to, even if you do not always vote for them?” respondents answered as follows:

	%
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	20
Sinn Féin	14
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	18
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)	20
Alliance	8
Other party (please specify)	2
None of these	15
Other answer	1
Don’t know	1

The results for 2008 show very little difference.

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	21
Sinn Féin	13
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	18
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)	19
Alliance Party	7
Other party	1
None of these	21
Other answer	0
Don’t know	1

At elections, a substantial number of voters opt for an extreme party.  The deviation from moderation seems to be greater on the Nationalist side.  Why is this? 

It is probably an instinct, in a sectarian voting system, that you vote for the party that you think will be strongest against the other (extreme) side.  Liam Clarke, writing in the Newsletter a couple of weeks ago, gave us this very insightful view.

Even the peace process was marked by an increase in support for the most extreme parties available, Sinn Fein and the DUP, who are now coming under pressure from yet harder line forces.

Part of the problem is that we human beings tend not to think of ourselves as extreme.

Our own views seem no more than common sense, the only response possible in the circumstances.

It is easier to spot extremism, blinkered views, perverse opinions and hypocrisy in those with whom we disagree.

And, having spotted these negative qualities, the next step is not to listen to the “self-serving nonsense” our opponents keep spouting.
We don’t have to hear them out to know they are wrong; it is easier to just stick to what we know to be right.

That leads me on to one reason why we often imagine that, as a society, we are really more moderate than the politicians we vote for in overwhelming numbers.

When Ian Paisley was still considered a hard liner, a party worker told me that many people voted for him but wouldn’t admit it to a journalist; they regarded it as a private matter like an insurance policy.

They counted on Paisley to raise the alarm if things were going wrong.
The same thing happened with Sinn Fein which for many years scored far lower in the polls than they did in elections – people didn’t like declaring themselves as Shinners, or even thinking of themselves as such, but they didn’t mind voting for them as a strong nationalist voice.

Clarke is probably right, subject to one modification. It probably does not matter if the strongest Unionist voice or the strongest Nationalist voice is extremist or moderate, so long as they are the strongest.   

This would suggest that the key to predicting the outcome of future elections lies in assessing who is the strongest party on a particular side of the sectarian divide.   However, that kind of voter mindset is liable to develop with a new set of circumstances.   It is still less than 3 years since all of the political parties accepted power sharing in Northern Ireland.   Could it be that voters will begin to assess the strength of a political party in more sophisticated ways than in the past?   Could it be that the ability of a party to negotiate, co-operate and govern in harmony with parties from the opposite designation will become a basis on which to judge a party’s strength? 

There are early signs that this may be starting to happen.  The Belfast Telegraph has began to take its own opinion polls.  In a follow up report, it published some but not all of its findings.  Its editor, Mike Gibson, made this comment:

This poll is a snapshot of course, but it is a very interesting snapshot.

“It suggests that we maybe moving into a different phase of political life here in which politicians are judged as much on their performance in the here and now as on their history.

“If so, that has to be seen as a positive step. If the message is that some people are recognising that politicians can begin the journey from conflict towards statesmanship it is to be welcomed.

“If the message is that our politicians must do more to leave their historical baggage at the door of the debating chamber that too is positive.”

This is a signal whifh neither Sinn Fein nor the DUP can afford to ignore, particularly in terms of how they handle the devlolution of policing and justice.  

The 2009 European Elections have already heralded a change in voting patterns on the Unionist side but none on the Nationalist side.  This suggests that up to June 2009, at least, the Northern Ireland electorate had not passed any judgment on the exercise of power sharing.  Rather, it was a neutral factor.

13.7% of the Northern Ireland electorate voted for Jim Allister of the TUV as a first preference vote at the Euro Elections.   Could it be that some former TUV voters are so disaffected by the fact that the DUP share power with Sinn Fein that they have decided never to vote for the DUP unless there is no unionist left? 

The fact that Nicholson was the first Unionist MEP to be elected on the 3^rd count, overtaking Diane Dodds of the DUP after the elimination of Jim Allister gives credence to that proposition.  Some of the TUV vote could also have been a personal vote for Allister or perhaps an ominous sign that amongst some of the Unionist voters, Jim Allister is now considered to be the strongest voice in Unionism.  In North Antrim, where Allister intends to stand at the General Election, he has a strong chance of establishing a new power base.

So far as the UUP are concerned, it is far too early to say whether the link-up with the Conservatives has benefited them electorally.  The Euro Elections came too quickly for the parties to put forward much more than a dull, but safe, campaign to secure the election of Jim Nicholson. 

One of the objects of the joint Conservative UUP pact is to bring an end to sectarian politics.  From the trend shown by the European Elections, I do not expect many more than token numbers of Catholics to switch their allegiance from one of the Nationalist parties at the next General Election. 

However, there are other factors which could benefit UCUNF.  The first assumes that amongst the Unionists, the TUV supporters will either vote for a TUV candidate or (if none) switch to a UCUNF candidate in an anti-DUP vote. 

What the Conservatives really want, as a first major step towards dominating politics in Northern Ireland, is to be seen, together with the UUP as the strongest voice in Unionism.  David Cameron is by far and away the most charismatic figure in the Unionist camp.  As to his likely impact and that of the Conservative campaign as a whole, we are in uncharted water.  It probably all boils down to the degree of interest taken by Northern Ireland voters in national politics.  If interest in National politics starts to take off properly in Northern Ireland, the Conservative campaign will make an impact. 

One other factor which would benefit UCUNF is if the Executive is brought down.  Such an event would almost certainly cause considerable damage to the DUP.  In that scenario, UCUNF would probably emerge as the largest unionist force.  This possibility is discussed further on.

On the Nationalist side, there will be a new SDLP leader by the time of the General Election.  It had previously been thought that Margaret Ritchie would win the leadership contest.  More recent insight suggests that the race is much closer with McDonald being seen as the “tougher” looking politician.  Toughness is something which the SDLP needs in its leadership.  Perhaps the long leadership election campaign will help both of these candidates to develop as tougher leaders.

Within the media, the question rages as to the extent of the damage to Gerry Adams’ reputation over his handling of his brother’s position as a Sinn Fein worker.  Within Northern Ireland at least, Sinn Fein has Martin McGuinness as a second political talisman.  A recent opinion poll has suggested that Martin McGuinness is the most popular of all ministers.  The Adams family scandal has a long way to run but so long as McGuinness is not implicated over the decision to ignore Liam Adams’ abuse of his daughter, I would expect little damage to Sinn Fein at the General Election.  Over a longer period, the scandal is much more likely to cause it much more damage as the drip feed of constant media exposure wears down the resistance of its supporters.

There is one more “But.”  Would Sinn Fein be damaged at the General Election if it brought down the Executive over Police and Justice? 

This is probably the one issue at Stormont which could influence the General Election.  If the Executive is brought down, the combined effect of this event and the Adams family scandal could be a lethal cocktail for Sinn Fein leading to a violent swing away from their core vote.  In that scenario, 3 seats could be lost (Fermanagh / S. Tyrone to UCUNF, West Tyrone to the SDLP and Newry Armagh to the SDLP).

That is a very big “if”.  It is hard to believe that Sinn Fein will have any stomach for bringing down the Executive but they will now need the DUP (who also have an interest in keeping the present administration alive) to find them a way out of the P & J crisis without losing face. 

As we move into the New Year, we wait in eager anticipation as these known unknowns to developing and possibly alter the political map of Northern Ireland. 

My prediction for the 18 Northern Ireland seats at the General Election (which assumes that the DUP and SF reach an understanding over P & J).

DUP  6   (down 3)

SF     5    (no change)

SDLP 3   (no change)

UCUNF  3  (up 2)

TUV  1 (up 1)

Finally, a very Happy New Year to all readers of this Blog.

Bringing down the Executive

With Sinn Fein threatening to bring down the executive, some interesting articles have appeared in blogs and newspapers. 

Writing for the BBC, Mark Davenport contemplates the collapse of the executive and tries to assess the thinking from within the Sinn Fein camp.  He concludes that their best option (Plan A) is to get Police and Justice devolved within the current Executive’s administration.  He hedges over whether Sinn Fein’s threat is just that or whether they are actually prepared to carry it out. 

Writing for the Sunday Times, Liam Clarke, disagrees with an assessment by an earlier article in the Irish Times that Sinn Fein Could benefit from pulling out of Government.   He concludes that there would be no winners if Sinn Fein were to carry out its threat.  He also believes that Sinn Fein is likely to come out worse than the DUP if Sinn Fein pull down the current Executive.

Clarke acknowledges that it is possible that Sinn Fein could end up as the largest party in Stormont after a quick Assembly election.  He then puts two obstacles in the way of Martin McGuinness becoming First Minister.  The first is that Unionist MLAs constitute themselves into a larger voting block than Sinn Fein. He says this

“Unionist parties could, some lawyers believe, constitute themselves into an assembly voting bloc larger than Sinn Fein.”

The crucial word in that statement is “some.”  I would find it very hard to believe that the majority of constitutional lawyers would accept that.   Section 16A(4) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (as amended states)

“The nominating officer of the largest political party of the largest political designation shall nominate a member of the Assembly to be the First Minister.”

With respect, I can not see how this provision can be circumvented.   It is possible, however, that some Unionist MLAs could defect from one party to another in order to Stop McGuinness’s appointment as FM.   Is it likely that this issue is so important to some MLAs that he or she will leave their party to achieve that?

Stranger things have happened.   This is a particularly dangerous problem for both the UUP and the DUP whether the elections are in 2010 or 2011.   In my work of fiction on the previous post, I have included defections from the DUP to the UUP as a possibility. 

The second point that Clarke makes about Sinn Fein’s prospects is that the DUP would refuse to nominate.  If that happens, it will indeed plunge Northern Ireland into another political crisis.  I agree that in that scenario, there are considerable risks for Sinn Fein.   However, I do not agree that it is certain that the DUP will refuse to nominate.   It is entirely possible that another form of compromise could emerge.  What would be the DUP’s position if Sinn Fein offered that a Sinn Fein MLA with no association with the IRA (such as Michelle Gildernew) was to become FM?

Just as Mark Davenport perceives Sinn Fein’s threat to pull down the Executive to be a potential bluff, the threat not to nominate could be a counter-bluff by the DUP.  

Clarke alludes to a scenario that it could end in tragedy for both the DUP and Sinn Fein.   I agree, although I am still inclined to believe that the DUP would suffer the greater damage.  For every loser, there is a winner.  It is possible that the UUP could become the largest party in the Assembly, if not the largest Unionist party.  That is more likely to happen if (as I have already stated) if there is a policy agreement with the Conservatives and the Assembly election happens on the same date as a General Election. 

If McGuinness does resign as deputy FM, it alters the political and voting dynamic of the General Election in Northern Ireland.  The Assembly and the General Elections could now be so closely linked in the public mind that it will be extremely difficult for UCUNF candidates to engage with voters on just National issues on the campaign trail.  That is why I believe it is very important that an attempt is made by both parties to reach some agreement on difficult policy issues that might otherwise be reserved purely for the Assembly.  If that can be achieved, it will benefit Conservative and Unionist candidates in both elections.

All of that said, it is still most likely scenario is that Sinn Fein will row back from the precipice.   Sean Woodward thinks so too.  He might know something crucial that the rest of us do not but it is becoming increasingly obvious that the DUP and Sinn Fein actually need each other.

Paisley’s praise for McGuinness – Is this a response to Jim Allister?

Last night, I received an interesting comment from Horseman on the post entitled “Allister sets a nasty trap for Peter Robinson“

He has identified a possible scenario where the DUP does indeed lose 9 more MLAs than McGuinness and suggests that some UUP MLAs could defect to the DUP in order to keep them as the largest political party. 

The last  UUP MLAs to defect  to the DUP were Jeffrey Donaldson, Arlene Foster and Nora Beare just after the Assembly elections in November 2003.   Much water has passed under the bridge since then.  The UUP’s decline was arrested during the Euro Elections.  However, any kind of disaffection can drive a politician to defect.   For example, there is no telling whether some left-wing Ulster Unionists, who are already upset about the electoral pact with the Conservatives, might be tempted to go that way.  

I think it is unlikely that any UUP MLA would defect for that reason.   Most UUP supporters see the DUP as having peaked and begin a long-term decline into obscurity.   The loss of 9 or more MLAs will add credence to that – the more so if the UUP then becomes the largest party at Stormont.   It is also possible that DUP MLAs could defect to the UUP to make them the largest party in protest at Peter Robinson failing to nominate the deputy FM.  Perhaps we should not get too carried away.   Politicians do have a responsibility to re-assure the voters that they will play by the rules and not seek to de-stabilise the Assembly, the Good Friday agreement and the St. Andrews Agreement for sectarian motives.   

Meanwhile, this morning, supporters of Jim Allister’s TUV could be choking in the corn flakes as they read the report in the Belfast Telegraph entitled “Ian Paisley praises Sinn Fein over Northern Ireland power sharing”

Or will they not be delighted?  Maybe they will think ‘We were right to form our own movement. This man really has lost it’

Politicians rarely make remarks which they know will upset and annoy some of their own followers without making some sort of political calculation.  So is there anything significant about Paisley’s remarks?

For many years, we have listened to “smash Sinn Fein” rhetoric from Mr. Paisley and his disciples.  This rhetoric did not stop when the DUP finally went into power sharing with Sinn Fein following the St. Andrews Agreement.  Only a few months ago, it still formed part of Diane Dodd’s European Election campaign.

Could it be that the DUP have finally recognised that the contradiction is working against them and that a new approach is needed?  Mr. Paisley could easily have said that his hard-line has been the reason why Sinn Fein have “danced to the DUP tune”  in Government.  However, actually praising Sinn Fein goes one step beyond that. 

Could it be that the DUP have seen Allister’s trap and have began to pave the way towards accepting Martin McGuinness as First Minister in 2011?

Jim Allister sets a nasty trap for Peter Robinson

In his post yesterday, Horseman has set out to put flesh on the bones of Jim Allister’s article on his website in which he sets out his plans to wreck the mechanism of power sharing in its present form.  

Horseman rightly highlights the amendment to the Good Friday Agreement brought about under the St. Andrews Agreement whereby the party with the largest number of MLAs gets to nominate the First Minister.  

According to Horseman, Allister’s plan depends for its success on

(a) The DUP losing 9 more seats than Sinn Fein

(b) Sinn Fein having the largest number of MLAs at Stormont

(c) the DUP refusing to nominate for Deputy First Minister.  

Is (c) really likely to happen?  The reality is that the offices of First Minister and Deputy First Minister hold equal power.  The Assumption seems to be that the DUP leadership is incapable of swallowing its own pride.   

There is one further possible scenario.  That is that the UUP becomes the largest party.  Would Sir Reg refuse to nominate the Deputy First Minister?  I don’t think so.   

Peter Robinson has to be asked what his party would do, given that scenario.  The voters of Northern Ireland (particularly those who currently support the DUP) have the right to know that.  Robinson would then be in rather a dilemma.  

If he says he would not nominate for DFM, he leaves his party is open to accusations of (a) reneging on a constitutional arrangement which his own party negotiated (b) failing on their own promise to “control” Sinn Fein through power sharing.   If he says that he will nominate, he will upset a large section of his own supporters who would find that too difficult to stomach and more likely vote for the TUV.

Jim Allister has set a nasty trap for Peter Robinson.  He and the DUP will have great difficulty avoiding it.